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HATE SPEECH AND ENFORCEMENT OF
THE FAIR HOUSING LAWS
MICHAEL P. SENG*
INTRODUCTION

Aggressive enforcement of the fair housing laws need not be
at the expense of the First Amendment. The Fair Housing Act
(the Act) broadly prohibits discrimination in housing based on
race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin and disability.' Specifically, the Act makes it unlawful "to coerce, intimidate, threaten or interfere" with any person's right to fair housing' and makes it a criminal offense to willfully injure, intimidate, threaten or interfere with or attempt to injure, intimidate or
interfere with, by force or threat of force, any person's fair housing rights.3
Other federal statutes also protect the right to be free from
discrimination in housing. Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act
prohibits state and federal officials from discriminating in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States.4 Sections
1981 and 1982 of the Civil Rights Act give all persons the equal
right to make and enforce contracts and to own or lease property
as enjoyed by white citizens.5 The state can impose criminal penalties on state and local officials who intentionally violate constitutional rights' and on any persons who conspire "to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the exercise of rights
under the Constitution and laws of the United States."'
A tempest in a teapot occurred in 1994 when the Federal
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) began an
investigation of a complaint filed under the Fair Housing Act'
alleging that a group of private citizens had violated the civil
* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School; Co-Executive Director
with Adjunct Professor F. Willis Caruso, The John Marshall Law School Fair Housing Legal Support Center.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (1988).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (1988).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1988).
6. 8 U.S.C. § 242 (1988).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1988).
8. Once a complaint is filed, HUD is required by law to investigate the complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (a)(1)(B)(iv) (1988).
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rights of disabled persons when they opposed plans to turn a
motel in Berkeley, California into low-income housing for recovering alcoholics and substance abusers.
HUD made a thorough inquiry of the matter and found that
the respondents had acted within their First Amendment rights
and that no violation had occurred. However, the press, which
correctly and zealously watches for abuses that may chill First
Amendment freedoms, began a relentless campaign against HUD
and particularly against Secretary Henry Cisneros and Under
Secretary Roberta Achtenberg. The Washington Times editorialized about Cisneros' war on the Constitution.9 The Wall Street
Journal referred to HUD's "thought police" and "vigilantes" and
compared the Berkeley respondents to "[d]issidents who got their
names in the papers in the days of the Soviet Union.""°
The adverse publicity prompted HUD to publish guidelines
aimed at protecting First Amendment rights during HUD investigations of fair housing complaints." In announcing these guidelines, Achtenberg referred to "friction between fair housing and
free-speech rights" and promised that HUD would be "ever mindful of the need to maintain the proper balance between these
rights." 2 The Fair Housing Act and the First Amendment are
not at war with each other. In fact, civil rights groups have been
the primary beneficiaries of the broad protection given to the
rights of free speech and protest under the First Amendment."3
The Fair Housing Act and the First Amendment are compatible.
The government conducts investigations of many activities to
determine whether a violation of the law exists. The government
places alleged terrorist groups under surveillance, audits campaign contributors and searches adult bookstores to determine if
their activities go beyond the protections of the First Amendment.
Investigations can chill First Amendment freedoms. For this reason investigations must be carefully supervised and controlled.
However, the government can draw lines between what is permissible and what is impermissible. 4 As in many other areas of the

9. Henry Cisneros' War on the Constitution, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1994, at
A16.
10. HUD's Thought Police, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 1994, at A12.
11. HUD Notice 95-2 from the Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity,
issued April 3, 1995, expires April 1, 1996.
12. Sometimes on a Tightrope at HUD, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1994, at A17.
13. The examples are endless. Some of the most well known instances where
civil rights groups benefited from a broad interpretation of the First Amendment
are: New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel); NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963) (litigation); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886
(1982) (boycott).
14. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit drew a careful
distinction between a proper and an improper investigation into activities implicat-
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law, we must depend on government to know and observe its
boundaries. In the United States remedies are available when the
government exceeds its boundaries. But the Berkeley debacle does
not mean that fair housing enforcement must come to a halt whenever respondents or their allies shout "First Amendment."
This Article will not discuss problems of commercial speech,
which traditionally receive less First Amendment protection. The
Fair Housing Act specifically prohibits discriminatory advertising,'" and this provision does not violate the First Amendment.16 Local communities can prohibit the posting of "For Sale"
signs to promote stable, racially integrated communities and to
stem the flight of white homeowners.17 Racist representations
made by real estate brokers, building managers or mortgage
lenders in the course of a commercial transaction are not protected by the First Amendment." Furthermore, purely private ac-

ing the First Amendment. In ACLU of Southern California v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457,
471 (D.C. Cir. 1991), the plaintiffs sought to enjoin government surveillance of
alleged terrorist activities on the basis of the First and Fourth Amendments. The
court stated:
The Government is not limited to investigating crimes already fully consummated. If an organization advocates terrorist acts in violation of federal law,
for example, the government surely could investigate it for that reason even
if the advocacy were protected by the First Amendment because it was not
directed to 'producing imminent lawless action' and was not likely to do
so.... Of course, if the threats were advanced in only the vaguest and most
general terms, and if after some investigation it became clear that the
group's only menace was 'rhetorical and ideological,' the government would
err by unnecessarily prolonging its investigation.
On the other hand, the government may be violating the First Amendment when it investigates someone because it dislikes the person's political
views. Such an investigation would necessarily have no other, legitimate
purpose. The Seventh Circuit so indicated in Alliance to End Repression and
we have held in a Bivens action for damages, that government agents violate
the Constitution when they conduct surveillance with the intent of deterring
membership in or destroying an association engaged in lawful activities.
Id. at 471 (citations omitted).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (c). In Ragin v. New York Times, 923 F.2d 995 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 821 (1991), the court held that the use of human models
indicating a racial preference in newspaper advertisements can violate the fair
housing laws. Id. at 998. In Jancik v. HUD, 44 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 1995), the court
held that a newspaper advertisement for a "mature person" violated the familial
status prohibitions in the Fair Housing Act. Id. at 559. HUD has issued guidelines
on when advertisements may violate the Act. Memorandum from Roberta
Achtenberg, HUD Under Secretary (Jan. 9, 1995).
16. See Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 382 (1973) (finding ordinance prohibiting newspaper from carrying sex designated advertising for non-exempt job opportunities did not violate the First
Amendment).
17. Linmark Associates Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 89 (1977).
18. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115, 121-22 (5th Cir.
1973).
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tion, such as a real estate broker who disciplines an employee
engaged in racist speech, does not implicate First Amendment
freedoms.
This Article first discusses the right to express unpopular
speech under the First Amendment. Next, this Article examines
the recognized limitations on speech under the First Amendment.
In the third section, this Article discusses two U.S. Supreme
Court cases involving hate speech and hate crimes. Finally, this
Article explores the special problems involving the Fair Housing
Act and the First Amendment.
I. THE RIGHT TO EXPRESS UNPOPULAR SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT

Mainstream Americans rarely are required to defend themselves through the First Amendment. The primary benefactors of
the First Amendment are persons who express unpopular ideas.
Most of us are uncomfortable with persons who win First Amendment cases. Nonetheless, those who are obnoxious, as well as
those who are polite, have the right to speak in our society. This
is what makes the First Amendment so precious. We cannot simply rely on our gut reactions when we want to suppress what
offends us. We constantly have to go back to the fundamental
principles of the First Amendment.
Justice Holmes challenged us to rise above our own prejudices in his dissent in Abrams v. United States:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the
very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation
upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that
experiment is part of our system I think that we should be eternally
vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that
we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and
pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to
save the country. 9
The men who inspired these words described themselves as
"rebels," "revolutionaries" and "anarchists." During World War I
they printed leaflets critical of the war with Germany and sup-

19. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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portive of the Russian Revolution. They were prosecuted under
the 1917 Espionage Act, as amended in 1918, that made it unlawful to "incite, provoke and encourage resistance to the United
States" in its war efforts.2"
Another dissident, Arthur Terminiello, created a near riot in
Chicago in the 1940's when he gave a pro-fascist, anti-Semitic
speech to a packed audience. 2 Nonetheless, he inspired these
words from Justice Douglas:
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to
invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions
as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions
and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of
an idea. That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown
likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive
evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.
There is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive view.
For the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either by
legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups.22
In 1989 while upholding the right of persons to burn the
American flag as a form of political protest, Justice Brennan rejected popular sentiment, declaring that "[i]f there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.... 23
One of the most emotional cases involving hate inspired
speech was the proposed march of the National Socialist Party of
America on the Chicago suburb of Skokie, Illinois in 1978.24
Skokie had a large Jewish population, including several thousand
survivors of the Nazi holocaust in Europe during World War II.
The Village tried to stop the march through a number of ordinances. Writing for the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
Judge Wilbur F. Pell, Jr. commented that:
No authorities need be cited to establish the proposition, which the
Village does not dispute, that First Amendment rights are truly
precious and fundamental to our national life. Nor is this truth

20. Justice Holmes wrote three earlier opinions that upheld the constitutionality of the 1917 Act: Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Frohwerk v.
United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); and Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211
(1919).
21. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 9 (1949).
22. Id. at 4-5 (citations omitted).
23. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 413 (1989)
24. Collins v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
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without relevance to the saddening historical images this case inevitably arouses. It is, after all, in part the fact that our constitutional
system protects minorities unpopular at a particular time or place
from governmental harassment and intimidation, that distinguishes
life in this country from life under the Third Reich.2"
Among its arguments to suppress the march, the Village
suggested that the dissemination of racially defamatory material
could undercut its fair housing policy. Judge Pell rejected this
argument stating "[tihat the effective exercise of First Amendment rights may undercut a given government's policy on some
issue is, indeed, one of the purposes of those rights. No distinction
is constitutionally admissible that turns on the intrinsic justice of
the particular policy in issue."26
Judge Pell also rejected the Village's argument that the display of swastikas and uniforms would create a substantive evil,
the infliction of psychic trauma, that the Village could prohibit.
He found that the court could not engraft an exception on the
First Amendment for such situations because they are indistinguishable in principle from speech that invites dispute, creates
unrest or stirs people to anger.27 He did find that "there is room
under the First Amendment for the government to protect targeted listeners from offensive speech, but only when the speaker
intrudes on the privacy of the home, or a captive audience cannot
practically avoid exposure." 2 This was not the case in Skokie
because Village residents could simply avoid the Village Hall for
thirty minutes on the Sunday afternoon when the march was to
take place.

I.

RECOGNIZED LIMITATIONS ON SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT

A. Advocacy of Force or Violence
The First Amendment does not protect violence.29 Questions
involving advocacy of violence are more problematic. Early on,
Justice Holmes articulated this concept:
[Tihe character of every act depends upon the circumstances in
which it is done.... The most stringent protection of free speech
would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater and
causing panic.... The question in every case is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 1201.
Id. at 1205.
Id. at 1206.
Id.
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982).
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substantive evil Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of
proximity and degree.3"
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized the distinction between advocacy of abstract doctrine and advocacy directed
at promoting unlawful action. 3 1 This distinction is not without
its problems. The Court itself has recognized "that distinctions between advocacy or teaching of abstract doctrines, with evil intent,
and that which is directed to action, are often subtle and difficult
to grasp, for in a broad sense, as Justice Holmes said in his dissenting opinion in Gitlow: 'Every idea is an incitement.'"3 2 Nonetheless, the distinction must be made.
The most recent formulation of the distinction was given by
the Supreme Court in Brandenburgv. Ohio:
[Tihe constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or
of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action. As we said in Noto v. United States "the mere abstract
teaching... of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a
resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group
for violent action and steeling it to such action." A statute which
fails to draw this distinction impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It
sweeps within its condemnation speech which our Constitution has
immunized from governmental control.33
B.

"FightingWords"

In Chaplinski v. New Hampshire,34 the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness who called a policeman
a "damned racketeer" and a "damned Fascist" on the ground that
these are words likely to cause a person to retaliate and to cause
a breach of the peace. The Court stated that:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting'
words - those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend
to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that

30. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
31. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318 (1957).
32. Id. at 326-27 (citation omitted).
33. 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (citations omitted).
34. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality.3 '
More recent opinions clearly limit what a court may construe
as a "fighting word." Courts cannot proscribe merely vulgar or
offensive speech. Thus in Gooding v. Wilson,35 the Supreme
Court reversed the convictions of a man who called a police officer
a "[w]hite son of a bitch."37
The speaker must direct "fighting words" to the person of the
hearer or intentionally provoke a given group to a hostile reaction.
Thus in Cohen v. California,5 the Supreme Court reversed the
conviction of a young man who was observed wearing a jacket
bearing the words "Fuck the Draft." The Court stated:
While the four letter word displayed by Cohen in relation to the
draft is not uncommonly employed in a personally provocative fashion, in this instance it was clearly not "directed to the person of the
hearer" . . . No individual actually or likely to be present could
reasonably have regarded the words on appellant's jacket as a direct
personal insult. Nor do we have here an instance of the exercise of
the state's police power to prevent a speaker from intentionally
provoking a given group to hostile reaction.... There is ... no
showing that anyone who saw Cohen was in fact violently aroused
or that appellant intended such a result.3 9
C. Racist Speech
In an early case, Beauharnais v. Illinois," the Supreme
Court upheld an Illinois law on group libel which made illegal any
publication which "portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or
lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed, or
religion which said publication.., exposes the citizens of any
race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy or
which is productive of breach of the peace or riots."4
Beauharnais had handed out leaflets asking a halt to "the further
encroachment, harassment and invasion of white people, their
property, neighborhoods and persons, by the Negro."42
This decision almost certainly is not good law today because
it is overbroad in its assertion that libel laws do not violate the
Constitution.43 Furthermore, language that merely has a tenden-

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 571-72.
405 U.S. 518 (1972).
Id. at 520.
403 U.S. 15 (1971).
Id. at 20.
343 U.S. 250 (1952).
Id. at 251.
Id. at 252.
See generally New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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cy to produce violence cannot be constitutionally suppressed."
Many international covenants and declarations prohibit racism.' However, the United States has not signed these agreements in part because of First Amendment considerations. The Supreme Court has emphasized:
[I]t is well established that 'no agreement with a foreign national
can confer power on the Congress or on any other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution,'...
Thus the fact that an interest is recognized in international law
does not automatically render that interest 'compelling' for purposes
of First Amendment analysis.'
D. "CaptiveAudience"
The Supreme Court has recognized that the state has an
interest in protecting residential privacy. In Carey v. Brown,47
the Court invalidated a residential picketing statute because it
was not content neutral. In the course of the opinion, Justice
Brennan stated that "[t]he State's interest in protecting the wellbeing, tranquillity, and privacy of the home is certainly of the
highest order in a free and civilized society.""
The "captive audience" exception does not serve to protect
persons from distasteful speech outside the home.49 Justice
Harlan emphasized in Cohen v. California:
While this Court has recognized that government may properly act
in many situations to prohibit intrusion into the privacy of the
home of unwelcome views and ideas which cannot be totally banned

44. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 10 (1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969)); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1204 (7th Cir. 1978) (citing Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
45. For instance, the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms
of Racial Discrimination requires that States to the Convention:
1. Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas
based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as
well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or
group of persons of another color or ethnic origin, and also the provision of
any assistance to racist activators, including financing thereof;
2. Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all
other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination,
and shall recognize participation in such organizations or activities as an
offence punishable by law;
3. Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local,
to promote or incite racial discrimination.
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Mar. 12, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
46. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988) (citation omitted).
47. 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
48. Id. at 471.
49. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1207 (7th Cir. 1978).
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from the public dialogue we have at the same time consistently
stressed that "we are often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of the
home and subject to objectional speech." The ability of government,
consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is, in other words, dependent upon a
showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an
essentially intolerable manner. Any broader view of this authority
would effectively empower a majority to silence dissidents simply as
a matter of personal predilections."0
III. R.A.V. AND MITCHELL
The Supreme Court has decided two cases that involve hate
speech and hate crimes. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul," several
teenagers violated a city ordinance prohibiting bias-motivated
conduct by burning a cross inside the yard of a black family. The
ordinance provided:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a
burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on
the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly
conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 2
All of the Justices agreed that the ordinance violated the
First Amendment, but they disagreed on the reason. The concurring Justices thought the law was unconstitutionally overbroad.
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court had tried to narrow the
ambiguity in the law to reach only "fighting words," the concurring Supreme Court Justices felt that the ordinance as construed
did not specifically identify the speech that the ordinance sought
to regulate but prohibited "expression that 'by its very utterance'
causes anger, alarm or resentment."53 The concurring Justices
based their opinion on the well established First Amendment
principle that "[tihe mere fact that expressive activity causes hurt
feelings, offense, or resentment does not render the expression
unprotected." 4
The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, took an opposite view and held that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it was underinclusive. Because the ordinance prohibited
only those "fighting words" that provoked violence "on the basis of
race, color, creed, religion, or gender," the law was not viewpoint

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (citations omitted).
505 U.S. 377 (1992).
Id. at 380.
Id. at 413 (White, J., concurring).

Id.
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neutral. The ordinance regulated speech based on its content.
Rather than proscribing all fighting words that communicate
ideas in a threatening manner, the ordinance selected certain
topics or messages that could not be communicated. Justice Scalia
stated:
Specifically [St. Paul asserts] that the ordinance helps to ensure the
basic human rights of members of groups that have historically
been subjected to discrimination, including the right of such group
members to live in peace where they wish. We do not doubt that
these interests are compelling, and that the ordinance can be said
to promote them. But the "danger of censorship" presented by a
facially content-based statute .. requires that the weapon be employed only where it is "necessary to serve the asserted [compelling]
interest."

. .

. The existence of adequate content-neutral alternatives

thus "undercut[s] significantly" any defense of such a statute ....

55

The majority opinion sets forth new ideas that are not yet
clear in their broader application. Justice Scalia takes a strict
approach to content based regulations of speech that is not traditionally protected under the First Amendment. His holding favors
broad rather than narrow regulation of "fighting words." Also, as
emphasized by Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion, while
the ordinance regulated speech based on its content, it was, nonetheless, viewpoint neutral. Justice Stevens emphasized the
ordinance's evenhandedness:
In a battle between advocates of tolerance and advocates of intolerance, the ordinance does not prevent either side from hurling fighting words at the other on the basis of their conflicting ideas, but it
does bar both sides from hurling such words on the basis of the
target's "race, color, creed, religion or gender." To extend the Court's
pugilistic metaphor, the St. Paul ordinance simply bans punches
"below the belt" - by either party. It does not, therefore, favor one
side of any debate.56
Justice Scalia distinguished the St. Paul ordinance from laws
where the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of
the very reason the entire class of speech can be proscribed or
where the subclass happens to be associated with particular "sec-

55. Id. at 395. In Madsen v. Womens' Health Center, 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994), the
Supreme Court upheld an injunction against blocking or interfering with access to
an abortion clinic. Id. at 2523. The Court rejected an argument that the injunction
was invalid because it was not content or viewpoint neutral. Id. The Court stated
that an injunction necessarily only applied to a particular group of persons or activities, and it does so because of the group's past activities in the context of a real
dispute between real parties. Id. The Court held that it would review an injunction
to see whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech
than necessary to serve a significant government interest. Id.
56. R.A V., 505 U.S. at 435 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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ondary effects" of the speech, so that the regulation is "justified
without reference to the content of the ...

speech."57 As an ex-

ample, he cited Title VII's general prohibition against sexual discrimination in employment to justify prohibiting sexually derogatory "fighting words" in the workplace. The "secondary effects"
exception would also apply to the Fair Housing Act where acts of
discrimination are not shielded because they express a discriminatory idea or philosophy.
In Wisconsin v. Mitchell," a unanimous Supreme Court held
that the First Amendment did not bar an enhanced sentence for
racially motivated criminal conduct. After watching the movie
"Mississippi Burning," several young black men selected a white
boy and beat him severely.5 9 Because the defendants intentionally selected the victim based on his race, Wisconsin law allowed a
maximum sentence of seven years, when normally the crime of
battery only carries a sentence of two years.60 Mitchell argued
that the statute punished bigoted thoughts or beliefs.6 1
The Court held that a physical assault is not expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. 62 Motive is relevant under federal and state anti-discrimination laws and may be used to
proscribe conduct unprotected by the First Amendment. 63 As an
example, the Court again cited Title VII, which makes it unlawful
for an employer to discriminate against an employee "because of
64
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
By inference, the First Amendment would not shield bias motivated violations of the Fair Housing Act.
IV.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS INVOLVING THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT

A. Petitioningthe Government
Petitioning the government is central to the First Amendment.65 Writing letters or telephoning government officials, attending and speaking out at government meetings, distributing

57. Id. at 388.
58. 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
59. Id. at 478-80.
60. Id. at 480.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 480.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 482 (citing Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984)).
65. The First Amendment provides that the government may not abridge the
freedom "to petition the Government for redress of grievances." U.S. CONST.

amend. I; see also Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures, 508
U.S. 49, 56 (1993); Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 614-15 (8th
Cir. 1980).
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leaflets to influence public opinion and organizing voters are basic
to a democratic system.
In Edwards v. South Carolina,6 the Supreme Court upheld
the rights of civil rights protesters to peacefully march on the
sidewalk around the State House to publicize their dissatisfaction
with the way black persons were treated by South Carolina law.
Justice Stewart noted that "[t]he circumstances of this case reflect
an exercise of ...basic constitutional rights in their most pristine
and classic form."67
In Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Commission,5 the
Supreme Court held that a state commission could not abridge a
corporation's freedom of speech to discuss controversial issues of
public policy. The Court stated:
The First and Fourteen Amendments guarantee that no State shall
"abridg[e] the freedom of speech." Freedom of speech is 'indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth," and "the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market.... ." The First and Fourteenth
Amendments remove 'governmental restraints from the arena of
public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be
voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of
such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and
more perfect polity. ..."

This Court has emphasized that the First Amendment "embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all
matters of public concern....,,9
The First Amendment protects not only those who present
their views openly; it also protects those who prefer to remain
anonymous. In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,7 ° the Supreme Court struck down an Ohio law that prohibited the distribution of anonymous campaign literature. Justice Stevens stated:
In Talley [v. California], the Court held that the First Amendment
protects the distribution of unsigned handbills urging readers to
boycott certain Los Angeles merchants who were allegedly engaging
in discriminatory employment practices. Writing for the Court, Justice Black noted that "[p]ersecuted groups and sects from time to
time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all." Justice Black recalled England's abusive press licensing laws and seditious libel
prosecutions, and he reminded us that even the arguments favoring
the ratification of the Constitution advanced in the Federalist Papers were published under fictitious names. On occasion, quite

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

372 U.S. 229 (1963).
Id. at 235.
447 U.S. 530 (1980).
Id. at 534-35 (citations omitted).
115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995).
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apart from any threat of persecution, an advocate may believe her
ideas will be more persuasive if her readers are unaware of her
identity. Anonymity thereby provides a way for a writer who may
be personally unpopular to ensure that readers will not prejudge
her message simply because they do not like its proponent. Thus,
even in the field of political rhetoric, where "the identity of the
speaker is an important component of many attempts to persuade,
the 1most effective advocates have sometimes opted for anonymi7
ty."
If neighborhood residents want to attend a meeting to speak out
against a group home for the disabled or if they want to distribute
anonymous leaflets urging the repeal of a local fair housing ordinance because they do not want African-Americans moving into
their neighborhood, they are protected by the First Amendment.
The First Amendment protects them regardless how hateful their
motivations.
However, if public officials act on these protests and take
discriminatory action, the officials may be found guilty of violating
rights protected by the Fair Housing Act. A party may use the
statements made by the citizens at the public meetings or the
petition signed by local residents as evidence to show that the
official action was taken for discriminatory reasons.72 In
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,7
a case involving an allegedly racially motivated denial of a rezoning request to build a multi-family housing complex, the Supreme
Court discussed the types of direct and circumstantial evidence
available to show an invidious discriminatory purpose. Courts
may look to the historical background, the sequence of events and
departures from normal procedure. 74 They may also look to the
legislative or administrative history, "especially where there are
contemporary statements by members of the decision-making
body, minutes of its meetings or reports. 7 s In this case, the trial
court had heard evidence that some of the opponents of the project
who had spoken at various hearings might have been motivated

71. Id. at 1516-17 (citations omitted).
72. See, e.g., LeBlanc - Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 428-29 (2d Cir. 1995)
(organization formed to keep Orthodox and Hasidic Jews out of community conspired with village to adopt zoning ordinance); United States v. City of Birmingham, Mich., 727 F.2d 60, 564-65 (6th Cir.) (opponents of racially integrated
low-income housing openly stated bigoted views and opinions and the commission
knowingly pursued policies that appeased these views), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821
(1984); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 n.3 (8th Cir. 1974)
(racist statements made and cheered at public meetings), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1042 (1975).
73. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
74. Id. at 266-67.
75. Id. at 268.
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by racial considerations; however, the trial court refused to find,
based on all the evidence, that the decisionmakers were motivated
by the same considerations.76 The Supreme Court emphasized in
Wisconsin v. Mitchell,77 that the First Amendment "does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech 7to establish the elements of a
crime or to prove motive or intent."
Public officials, like everyone else, enjoy First Amendment
rights, but they cannot act in violation of the Constitution or laws
of the United States. 79 Legislative immunity may in a proper
case prevent city council members from being called to testify
about their motivations in casting a vote80 and will certainly
shield their legislative acts if they are sued for damages. 8 ' However, what they say is relevant in proving illegal discrimination.82
B. Residential Picketing and Demonstrations
Local residents may make their grievances known within the
neighborhood. The classic case involving a neighborhood demonstration is Organizationfor a Better Austin v. Keefe.83 Organization for a Better Austin (OBA) was a racially integrated community group in a Chicago neighborhood that was working to "stabilize" the neighborhood.8 OBA specifically fought various real
estate tactics known as "blockbusting" or "panic peddling." 5
Keefe was a real estate broker whom OBA accused of arousing the
fears of local white residents that Blacks were moving into their
neighborhood in order to get them to sell their homes.8 6 Many
brokers signed an agreement with OBA not to engage in these
tactics, but Keefe denied that he engaged in blockbusting and
refused to sign.8 7 OBA members distributed leaflets critical of
Keefe's activities in the suburb where he lived. 8 The leaflets
were distributed at a local shopping center, to parishioners at the
church Keefe attended and to his neighbors by leaving copies at

76. Id. at 269.
77. 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
78. Id. at 481.
79. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
80. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268
(1977).
81. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951).
82. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268.
83. 403 U.S. 415 (1971).
84. Id.

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 417.
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their homes. 9
Keefe obtained an injunction from the Circuit Court of Cook
County ordering OBA to cease its leaflet distribution. The Illinois
Appellate court affirmed the injunction on the ground that OBA's
activities were "coercive and intimidating, rather than informative
and therefore ...

not entitled to First Amendment protection."9 °

Chief Justice Burger held that the injunction was an illegal
prior restraint on First Amendment rights. He rejected the argument that coercive activities receive no First Amendment protection:
Petitioners plainly intended to influence respondent's conduct by
their activities; this is not fundamentally different from the function
of a newspaper. Petitioners were engaged openly and vigorously in
making the public aware of respondent's real estate practices. Those
practices were offensive to them, as the views and practices of petitioners are no doubt offensive to others. But so long as the means

are peaceful, the communication need not meet standards of acceptability.9'
Burger also rejected the argument that the leafletting invaded
Keefe's privacy. The injunction did not attempt to stop the flow of
information into Keefe's own home; rather it attempted to stop the
flow of information to the public.92
The activities of the OBA were consistent with and supported
the policies underlying the Fair Housing Act. But the same principles would forbid the suppression of activities critical of fair housing or of groups protected by the fair housing laws.
Picketing is a form of First Amendment expression.93 The
public streets and sidewalks are traditional public fora for First
Amendment expression,94 including the public streets and sidewalks in residential neighborhoods.9 " Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court has noted that picketing involves elements of both speech
and conduct and is subject to controls not constitutionally permissible in cases of pure speech.96 Courts may properly enjoin
picketing that strays from the public streets and sidewalks onto
private property.97 Courts may limit the number of pickets; 98
89. Id.
90. Id. at 418.
91. Id. at 419 (citation omitted).
92. Id. at 420.
93. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 94 (1940).
94. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 504 (1939).
95. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,
460 (1980); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 403 U.S. 415 (1971); Gregory
v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 117 (1969).
96. Amalgamated Food Employees, Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308, 313 (1968); International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt,
Inc., 354 U. S. 284, 292 (1957).
97. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 511 (1976); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S.

1996]

Hate Speech

they may regulate spaces between picket lines to prevent obstructions;99 and they may subject the time when the picket is conducted to reasonable regulation.'00
The Supreme Court has affirmed the constitutionality of a
narrowly drafted ordinance aimed at picketing that targets a
particular residence. In Frisby v. Schultz," 1 an ordinance prohibited individuals opposed to abortions from picketing the home
of a doctor who performed abortions. In upholding the ordinance,
Justice O'Connor reaffirmed that restrictions on public issue picketing are subject to careful scrutiny."°2 O'Connor also reaffirmed
that public streets and sidewalks in residential neighborhoods are
public fora.'0 3 O'Connor construed the ordinance only to ban focused picketing taking place solely in front of a particular residence and not "[g]eneral marching through residential neighborhoods, or even walking a route in front of an entire block of
houses.""° O'Connor found the ordinance narrowly tailored to
protect only unwilling recipients of the communication:
The type of focused picketing prohibited by the Brookfield ordinance
is fundamentally different from more generally directed means of
communication that may not be completely banned in residential
areas.... In such cases "the flow of information [is not] into...
household[s], but to the public." Here, in contrast, the picketing is
narrowly directed at the household, not the public. The type of
picketers banned by the Brookfield ordinance generally do not seek
to disseminate a message to the general public, but to intrude upon
the targeted resident, and to do so in an especially offensive way.
Moreover, even if some such picketers have a broader communicative purpose, their activity nonetheless inherently and offensively
intrudes on residential privacy. The devastating effect of targeted
105
picketing on the quiet enjoyment of the home is beyond doubt[.]
Here, Justice O'Connor further emphasized that the ordinance was content-neutral.' 6 However, in Carey v. Brown, °7

39, 44 (1966).
98. United States v. Pyle, 518 F. Supp. 139, 160 (E.D. Pa. 1981). But see Davis
v. Francois, 395 F.2d 730, 735 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding that ordinance limiting the
number of pickets to two, regardless of the time, place or circumstances was unconstitutional).
99. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U.S. 569, 573 (1941).
100. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972); Carpenters & Joiners
Union, Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 738 (1942) (Reed, J., dissenting).
101. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
102. Id. at 479.
103. Id. at 480-81.
104. Id. at 483.
105. Id. at 486 (citation omitted).
106. Id. at 481.
107. 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
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the Supreme Court struck down a residential picketing statute
that distinguished speech based on its content. An Illinois statute
barred residential picketing but exempted labor picketing.0 8 A
civil rights organization picketed Chicago's mayor to protest racial
segregation in Chicago's public schools. °9 The protesters were
arrested and convicted under the statute.110 The Supreme Court
held that the statute illegally discriminated among pickets based
on the subject matter of their expression.'
The Court in Carey cited another limitation on picketing - it
cannot be directed at an illegal purpose. 1 2 Picketing cannot be
used to pressure someone to do something that is illegal." 3 In
Hughes v. Superior Court,"4 the United State Supreme Court
upheld a California state court injunction prohibiting the picketing of a store to secure compliance with a demand that the race of
its employees be in proportion to the race of its customers. The
Court found that California could invoke an injunction to protect
5
businesses from being forced to engage in proportional hiring."
In contrast, in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,"' the
Supreme Court held that a non-violent boycott of white businesses
to protest racial injustices was protected by the First Amendment.
The Court distinguished secondary boycotts and picketing by labor
unions from peaceful political activities, which have "always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values."" '7 While the distinction comes close to content regulation,
the distinction turns upon the legality of what is proposed. Picketing a real estate office to force it to violate the Fair Housing Act
would be illegal." 8 Picketing a real estate office to protest blockbusting that violates the Fair Housing Act would be protected by
the First Amendment," 9 as would picketing on matters of gen-

108. Id. at 455.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 470.
113. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 611
(1980) (prohibiting picketing that encourages customers to boycott a secondary
business in violation of the National Labor Relations Act); International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 289 (1957) (prohibiting
picketing that is directed toward achieving a "union shop" in violation of state
law); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 499 (1949) (prohibiting
picketing to force company into a combination that would violate state antitrust
law).
114. 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
115. Id. at 463.
116. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
117. Id. at 912-13.
118. E.g., Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 886; Hughes, 339 U.S. at 460.
119. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 421 (1971).
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eral public concern.120
C. Coercive, Threatening, Intimidatingor HarassingBehavior
The government cannot curtail speech simply because it is
offensive and, as Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe 2 '
points out, the government also cannot curtail speech simply because it is coercive. However, the government may proscribe
speech which incites imminent unlawful action or which is associated with particular "secondary effects." The distinctions between
these categories of speech may on occasion require careful inquiry
into the facts and circumstances.
When does speech cross the line between being merely offensive and producing the illegal "secondary effects" proscribed under
the Fair Housing Act? The distinction would seem to lie between
speech which merely expresses disapproval of government policies
or even of particular neighborhood residents and speech which
directly prevents someone from enjoying their property rights
protected by the Fair Housing Act. Several cases demonstrate
when such speech crosses the line.
In Sofarelli v. Pinellas County,'22 the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff might be able to prove
a violation of the Fair Housing Act and, therefore, the district
court should not have dismissed portions of his complaint.
Sofarelli planned to move a house and potentially sell it to a minority purchaser. 2 3 Sofarelli claimed that neighbors blocked the
road, left notes threatening Sofarelli if he did not get out of the
neighborhood, ran up to his truck and hit it, called Sofarelli obscenities and spit at him.' 24 Sofarelli presented strong evidence
that these actions were racially motivated. 12 The Court held
that Sofarelli stated a claim for coercion and intimidation. 26
Sofarelli should be able to prove a violation if: the notes did indeed threaten serious imminent harm; the conduct of restraining
the trailer, hitting the truck and spitting interfered with the
rights protected by the Act; and, these actions were not merely
annoyances. 127
A closer case is People Helpers Foundation v. City of Richmond. 12' The district court denied a motion to dismiss a com-

120. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 886; Carey, 447 U.S. at 455.
121. 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
122. 931 F.2d 718 (11th Cir. 1991).

123. Id. at 721.
124. Id. at 722.
125. Id.

126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 781 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D. Va. 1992).
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plaint brought by the Foundation against two individuals, the
Riddells, who lived directly across the street from one of the
Foundation's housing facilities.129 The Foundation's mission included finding housing for disabled individuals, many of whom
were African-American. 3 0 The Riddells made derogatory com3
ments about African-Americans to Foundation employees.1 1
When furniture was moved into the facility, the Riddells gathered
their neighbors together in a threatening manner on their front
lawn across the street from the facility.'32 Mrs. Riddell also
stood in her front yard on numerous occasions taking photographs
of the Foundation's helpers and staff.1 33 The Foundation alleged
that these actions were taken to create an atmosphere of intimidation to prevent the disabled persons from locating in the neighborhood. 34 The Riddells also complained to the police that they
did not want these "types" living in the building. 13 The police
threatened to close the facility even though it did not violate the
138
building codes.
The district court noted that the conduct alleged was not
particularly egregious as measured by other cases, but allowed the
plaintiffs to proceed with their case.' 37 On the basis of the allegations, the plaintiffs would have difficulty proving a violation of
Section 3617 of the Act. While clearly hateful and offensive, the
conduct involved no trespass or threats of violence. As an administrative matter, the police, instead of supporting the Riddells in
their demands that the home be moved, should have simply told
them to lay off.
An egregious situation involving threats of violence was HUD
v. Johnson,3 8 a case tried by HUD Chief Administrative Law
Judge Alan Heifetz. The complainants were an African-American
man, Simpson, who moved into a public housing project, and a
white man, Dennis, who was a resident and tenant council president of the seventy-four unit public housing project in Vidor, Texas. 39 Until that time all the residents in the housing project
were white. 4 ° Edith Johnson, who lived across the street from
Simpson, shouted slurs and threats at him whenever she saw

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 1136.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1138.
Id.
Id.
Id.
P.H. Fair Housing - Fair Lending
Id. at 25,706.3.
Id.

25,706 (1994).
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him."4 She called him a "nigger" and on numerous occasions
threatened to kill him with a baseball bat and a gun."" She ridiculed Dennis as a "nigger lover."143 She boasted about attending Ku Klux Klan meetings and talked about burning down
the apartment complex.'"
She encouraged others to make sim45
ilar slurs and threats."
The complainants took Johnson's threats seriously. She
boasted of having been in the penitentiary and killing an AfricanAmerican with a pork chop bone." 6 She distributed literature
that talked about "beating back ... minorities."147 The complainants alleged they suffered severe emotional trauma, were
forced8 to alter their lives and both eventually moved from the project.
Judge Heifetz found a violation of Section 3617.149 He ordered Johnson to pay $175,000 to Simpson's estate, $125,300 to
Dennis and a civil penalty of $10,000.'0° The threats and intimidation in Johnson were clearly prohibited by Section 3617 of the
Act. Similarly, violence itself violates Section 3617 of the Act.
Violence is not protected by the First Amendment and, if done to
coerce and threaten people who move into a neighborhood, a clear
violation of Section 3617 of the Act occurs. Thus, firebombing a
home' 5 ' or an automobile' 2 or committing assault or battery
or property damage to coerce a person to move out of 4a neighborhood' 5 3 are illegal acts under Section 3617 of the Act.'
D. Cross-Burning
Cross-burnings belong to a special category. They have long
been associated with the Ku Klux Klan, perhaps the most notorious of the hate organizations that have flourished in the United
States. Cross-burnings convey a clear message of racism, anti-

141. Id.

142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.

149. Id. at 25,706.4.
150. Id.

151. Stirgus v. Benoit, 720 F. Supp. 119, 124 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
152. Stackhouse v. De Sitter, 620 F Supp. 208, 212 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
1988).
153. Seapus v. Lilly, 691 F. Supp. 127, 134 (N.D. Ill.
154. Law enforcement officials may violate the Fair Housing Act if they do not
provide equal police protection to minority homeowners who suffer harassment
from their neighbors. Campbell v. City of Berwyn, 815 F. Supp. 1138, 1142 (N.D.
Ill. 1993).
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Semitism, anti-Catholicism and nativism. Cross-burnings historically precede acts of unspeakable violence. They are meant to put
terror in the hearts of those the Klan targets.
Like flag burning 15 5 or saluting a red flag,'5 6 cross-burning is a form of symbolic speech. Its message is clearly one of
hate. But no matter how distasteful, a cross-burning is communicative. Does such communication of hate and terror merit any
protection under the First Amendment?
In his opinion in R.A.V. v. St. Paul,'57 Justice Scalia reversed the conviction of the teenage cross-burners because of the
impermissible content discrimination in the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance. Scalia began his opinion by stating, however,
that the city could have punished the defendants for violations of
any number of other Minnesota laws, including prohibitions
against making
terroristic threats, arson and criminal damage to
58
property.
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and
Eighth Circuits have each reviewed cross-burning cases. The Seventh Circuit used a "secondary effects" analysis and the Eighth
Circuit an "imminent danger" analysis in testing cross-burning
against the First Amendment.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals examined cross-burning in United States v. Haywood."9 The defendants were
prosecuted under Section 3631 of the Act for interfering with
housing rights by force or threat of force. 60 They had burned
two crosses on the property of a white family that had entertained
black persons in their home. The Court stated that:
Inevitably the cross-burnings here involved some degree of expression conduct, albeit not absolutely protected conduct. No doubt, the
defendants wanted to express their dislike, even hatred, of blacks
through the cross-burnings. But the act of cross-burning also promotes fear, intimidation, and psychological injury. Therein lies the
reason cross-burning, as done in this case, lacks First Amendment
protection. 1

155. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989); see also United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 371 (1968) (draft card burning).
156. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 366 (1931); see also Tinker v. Des
Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (wearing a black armband).
157. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
158. Id. at 2541 n.1.
159. 6 F.3d 1241 (7th Cir. 1993).
160. The defendants were also prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 844 (h)(1) prohibiting the use of fire or an explosive to commit a felony. Id. at 1248. The appeals
court rejected the defendants' argument that this statue was only intended to apply in arson cases. Id. The court found § 844 to be clear and unambiguous and to
apply to any felony including cross-burnings to violate a person's civil rights. Id.
161. Id. at 1250 (citation omitted).
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The Court found that the government's regulation of the
defendant's conduct was unrelated to the suppression of free expression:
The purpose of Section 3631(b) is to protect the right of an individual to associate freely in his home with anyone, regardless of race. To
achieve that end, the statue prohibits acts of willful intimidation
against people based on race. The statue, then, is aimed at curtailing wrongful conduct in the form of threats or intimidation, and not
toward curtailing any particular form of speech.'62
Because Section 3631(b) of the Act is content neutral, the
court analyzed it under the four-part framework of United States
v. O'Brien.'6 3 First, Congress had power to enact the statute under the Thirteenth Amendment to eradicate the badges and incidents of slavery." Second, the statute advances a substantial
governmental interest by protecting a person's right to occupy a
dwelling free from threats or intimidation because of race.'65
Third, the statute does not proscribe cross-burning as a form of
expressive conduct, hence the government's interest is unrelated
to suppressing free expression. 166 Fourth, the government does
not target conduct on the basis of its expressive content, and consequently acts are not shielded from regulation because they express a discriminatory idea or philosophy. 1 7 Hence, "any incidental restrictions on alleged First Amendment rights in this case
are no greater than is necessary to further the government's valid
interest of protecting the rights of those in the Jones' household to
associate freely with whomever they choose." 6 s
District courts in Chicago have followed Haywood's approach
to cross-burning in two civil cases. In Cotton v. Duncan 169 an
African-American family filed a suit for damages against two
minors who burned a cross with the inscription "KKK Rules" on
their front lawn. 7 ° They alleged violations of Sections 1982,
1985(3), 3617 and the Illinois Hate Crime law. 17' The court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. Relying on
Haywood, the Court held:

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. (citation omitted).
301 U.S. 367 (1968).
Id. at 374.
Id.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Haywood, 6 F.3d 1241, 1250-51 (7th Cir. 1993).
No. 93C3875, 1993 WL 473622 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 15, 1993).
Id. at *1.
Id.
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Because burning a cross on an African-American family's front lawn
with the inscription "KKK Rules" emblazoned upon it is clearly
conduct that can be regulated without offending the protections of
the First Amendment, we reject Duncan's free speech argument
172
without further analysis.
Similarly, in Johnson v. Smith,'73 the District Court upheld
a civil rights action brought under Sections 1982, 1985(3) and
3617 by a white woman, her two African-American children and
her daughter-in-law. The defendants allegedly burned a cross in
174
the plaintiffs' yard and threw a brick through the window.
The court subsequently awarded compensatory damages to the
four plaintiffs totalling $87,151, and punitive damages totalling
$168,000.175
The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a different analysis. In United States v. Lee,176 the defendant Lee was convicted
of a conspiracy to violate civil rights under Section 241.177 Lee
burned a cross on a hill overlooking an apartment complex where
a number of black families resided. 178 The Eight Circuit found
that cross-burning is symbolic expression protected by the First
Amendment. 179 Because Section 241 is content neutral on its
face, the sole question on appeal was whether the jury was properly instructed.180 The trial court had instructed the jury that
the defendant must have acted "with the specific intent to intimidate or interfere with the residents' rights to occupy a dwelling
free of force or threats of force based on race."1 " The trial court
broadly defined "threaten" and "intimidate" and did not require "a
18 2
threat of physical force or the intimidation of physical fear."
The Court of Appeals found the instruction too broad because
"it would criminalize a great deal of conduct, some of it pure
speech, which does no more than forcefully state a view that others find revolting or appalling."18 3 The Court also rejected the
prosecution's "secondary effects" argument and held that crossburning could not be "swept up incidentally" within a statute

172.
173.
174.
175.
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177.
1299.
178.
179.
180.
181.
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183.

Id at *3.
810 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. 111. 1992).
Id. at 1236.
Johnson v. Smith, 890 F. Supp. 726, 730 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
6 F.3d 1297 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1550 (1994).
The defendant was acquitted by the jury of a violation of § 3631. Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1297.
Id. at 1298-99.
Id. at 1301.
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prohibiting housing discrimination.' 4 The Court relied on
Brandenburg v. Ohio,' s5 and held that the expression must be
"directed to inciting and producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action."'8 6 Lee could be convicted
if he intended to threaten acts of violence against the black residents of the apartment, or at least intended to cause the residents
to reasonably fear the use of imminent force or violence."8 7
The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed the Lee formulation in United States v. Juvenile Male J.H.H.'8 8 The same juveniles whose convictions under the St. Paul Ordinance were
invalidated in R.A.V.' 89 were later convicted of cross-burning under Sections 241 and 3631. The court reaffirmed the Lee holding
that cross-burning is not inevitably beyond the pale of the First
Amendment.' 90 It noted that in some situations cross-burning
might be done solely to make a political statement, "as reprehensible as that might be." 9 ' The Court also reaffirmed the formulation of the jury instruction approved in Lee.'92 The Court
found that the evidence supported the finding that the cross-burnings were intended to threaten the black family with violence or
at least to cause the
family reasonably to fear the imminent use of
193
force or violence.
In Haywood, the Seventh Circuit focused on the "secondary
effects" of cross-burning and found it not protected by the First
Amendment.' 94 The government did not target the conduct because of its expressive content but because it was a discriminatory
practice prohibited by the Fair Housing Act.' 95 The Eighth Circuit rejected this approach. It found that cross-burning can be a
form of symbolic speech. It required that at a minimum the party
must intend that the cross-burning causes the victims to reasonably fear the use of imminent force or violence.' 96 HUD has
adopted the approach urged by the Eighth Circuit in reviewing
cases for prosecution.' 97 As a practical matter, the two standards will probably produce the same result in most cases because
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Lee, 6 F.3d at 1302.
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someone who burns a cross so as to interfere with another's fair
housing rights will inevitably have the intent to put that person
in imminent fear of force or violence.
Cross-burning is clearly a form of First Amendment expression. It is certainly offensive, but offensive speech is not outside
the protection of the First Amendment. Supreme Court opinions
distinguish between speech that is merely offensive and speech
that threatens force and violence. Congress likely intended to
employ this distinction in defining a crime under Section 1361
when it used the words "force or threat of force."' 98 Section
3617, which provides for civil liability, is written more broadly.
Congress likely intended that psychological intimidation alone
without the threat of force or violence could provide the basis for a
civil action under Section 3617. Cross-burnings that have the
"secondary effect" of interfering with the right to fair housing,
either because they threaten violence or because they cause serious psychological distress, could thus be proscribed under Section
3617 without violating the First Amendment.
E. Litigation

Litigation can impede persons from exercising their rights
under the Fair Housing Act. The issue has arisen in a number of
different contexts.
In Woods-Drake v. Lundy, 9' the Court of Appeals for the

Fifth Circuit found that a landlord could violate Section 3604 of
the Act and Section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act by threatening to
evict tenants if they continued to entertain black guests. Such
conduct directly violated Section 3604 and 1982 in that the landlord discriminated against the tenants in the "terms, conditions
and privileges of rental" on the ground of race.2 °°
A court also found a violation of Section 3604 in United
States v. Scott.20 ' Neighbors brought a state court action to en-

force a restrictive covenant against converting a residence into a
group home for the mentally retarded.2 2 The state court found
that the group home did not violate its restrictive covenant.20 3

198. The California Supreme Court, in a thoughtful decision in People v. M.S.,
896 P.2d 1365, 1374 (Cal. 1995), discussed conditions under which a threat is not
protected by the First Amendment. The court required the prosecution prove that
the speech itself seriously threatened violence and that the defendant had the
"apparent ability" to carry out the threat, meaning that the threat "would reasonably tend to induce fear in the victim." Id.
199. 667 F.2d 1198, 1201 (5th Cir. 1982).
200. Id.
201. 788 F. Supp. 1555 (D. Kan. 1992).
202. Id. at 1556.

203. Id.
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The state court, however, refused to assess attorneys' fees against
the neighbors because the action was not frivolous." 4
Thereafter, HUD issued a charge against the neighbors which the
parties elected to litigate in federal district court. The Justice
Department prosecuted the suit.2" 5 The United States moved for
partial summary judgment on the issue of whether the state court
action violated Section 3604.206 The district court held that the
language of Section 3604 reasonably encompassed the act of enforcing a neutral restrictive covenant through the judicial system
for the purpose of denying equal housing opportunity to disabled
persons.2 7
In Northside Realty Associates v. Chapman,0 8 the district
court found a violation of Section 3617 of the Act. A real estate
broker had brought a class action in state court against fair housing testers for damages. 2 9 The broker claimed interference with
economic relations, trespass, nuisance, implied contract, unjust
enrichment and libel. 21 The defendants removed the action to
federal court on the ground that the action violated Section 3617
of the Act. 21 ' The district court held that the defendants should
be given the opportunity to prove that the action had "the effect of
coercing, intimidating, threatening, and otherwise interfering with
their rights under § 3617. "212
Similarly in Casa Marie Inc., v. Superior Court of Puerto
Rico,21 3 a district court held that the plaintiffs had issued an injunction under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act and Section
3617 of the Act against neighbors who had filed for and obtained
an injunction in state court to halt the renovation and use of a
home for handicapped elderly persons. The court held that the
plaintiffs had "a right to be free of neighborhood interference as
they provide residence for the elderly handicapped."2 14 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the district court's actions of enjoining the state court order was barred
by the Anti-Injunction Act 215 and Younger abstention. 216 The

204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1562-63.
208. 411 F. Supp. 1195 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
209. Id. at 1196-97.
210. Id. at 1197.
211. Removal was sought under the Civil Rights Removal Statute. Id. at 1196.
See Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 785 (1966); City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384
U.S. 808, 812 (1966).
212. Northside Realty, 411 F. Supp. at 1199-1200.
213. 752 F. Supp. 1152 (D.P.R. 1990), rev'd, 988 F.2d 252 (1st Cir. 1993).
214. Id. at 1169.
215. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988).
216. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971) (holding that the interests of
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Court of Appeals also held that the plaintiffs had failed to state a
claim under Section 1983 because there was no state action.217
None of these cases discussed whether the First Amendment
protects the filing of the lawsuit. The Supreme Court has clearly
established that litigation can be a form of political expression
protected by the First Amendment.
In NAACP v. Button,218 the Supreme Court held that Virginia statutes conflicted with First Amendment freedoms. The
statutes made it illegal to advise potential litigants to seek assistance from particular lawyers and to advise persons that their
legal rights had been violated. Justice Brennan stated: "[litigation] is ...a form of political expression. Groups which find themselves unable to achieve their objectives through the ballot frequently turn to the courts ... [U]nder the conditions of modern
government, litigation may well be the sole practicable avenue
open to a minority to petition for redress of grievances." 21 9 This
statement about the right of the NAACP to engage in litigation to
vindicate the rights of African-Americans applies to all persons
who resort to the courts to protect what they believe are their
rights.
The right to litigate is, of course, not absolute. It does not
immunize baseless litigation. 220 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognize the right to litigate is not absolute by limiting
the filing of lawsuits. Rule 11 specifically provides that the person
filing the lawsuit must certify that:
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the
cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are
warranted by existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary
support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary
support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence
or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of

comity and federalism prevent a federal court from interfering with pending state
court proceedings that implicate a vital state interest).
217. Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico, 988 F.2d 252, 260 (1st
Cir. 1993).
218. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
219. Id. at 429-30.
220. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 484 (1985) ('[B]aseless litigation is not
immunized by the First Amendment right to petition.").

1996]

Hate Speech

221
information or belief.

Rule 11 provides two grounds for sanctions. The first is when
the lawsuit is "frivolous" and the second is when the lawsuit was
filed for an "improper purpose."222 The standard for testing
whether a lawsuit is "frivolous" is objective reasonableness.2 23
The "improper purpose" clause applies a subjective standard and
is analogous to "the torts of abuse of process (filing an objectively
frivolous suit) and malicious prosecution (filing a colorable suit for
the purpose of imposing expense on the defendant rather than for
224
the purpose of winning)."

The results of the lawsuits discussed above are arguably
consistent with Rule 11. The court found that the lawsuits were
filed for the "improper purpose" of interfering with rights protected by the Fair Housing Act. 225 But does this standard give sufficient protection to the First Amendment?
In United States v. Robinson,226 the defendants raised the
First Amendment as a defense in an action for damages filed in
Federal Court under the Fair Housing Act. The defendants were
neighbors who had filed a lawsuit in state court to enforce a facially valid zoning ordinance to bar a family containing handicapped foster children from occupying a residence without first
getting a variance or a zoning permit. The neighbors had voluntarily dismissed the action in state court.
The district court held that the neighbors were not protected
by an absolute immunity from liability under the Fair Housing
Act when they filed their lawsuit in state court. The First Amendment afforded them only a qualified immunity that depended
upon whether the lawsuit was a genuine exercise of the right to

221. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
222. Lancellotti v. Fay, 909 F.2d 15, 22 (1st Cir. 1990); Brown v. Federation of
State Medical Boards, 830 F.2d 1429, 1435-36 (7th Cir. 1987); Zaldwar v. City of
Los Angeles, 708 F.2d 823, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1986).
223. Lancellotti, 909 F.2d at 22; Brown, 830 F.2d at 1436; Zaldwar, 708 F.2d at
830-31.
224. Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1083 (7th Cir.
1987); Ridge v. United States Postal Service, 154 F.R.D. 182, 184 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
225. The district court in Casa Marie Inc. v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico, 732
F. Supp. 1152 (D.P.R. 1990), rev'd, 988 F.2d 252 (1st Cir. 1993), found that the
filing of the injunction in state court had both a discriminatory intent and effect
against the elderly disabled residents of the group home. Id. at 1157. However, the
Court of Appeals noted that even a finding of discriminatory effect required some
showing of a discriminatory purpose and questioned whether the trial court could
have found a causal link between the discriminatory actions of the neighbors and
the injury to the plaintiffs because the state court had also found that the home
did not comply with the zoning laws. Casa Marie Inc. v. Superior Court of Puerto
Rico, 988 F.2d 252, 269-70 (1st Cir. 1993).
226. P.H. Fair Housing - Fair Lending T 15,979 (D. Conn. 1995).
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petition or whether it constituted baseless litigation.227 The
court held that the standard for determining if litigation is baseless is whether the lawsuit is supported by "a reasonable basis in
law or fact" or was "objectively meritless."22 8 In finding that the
state lawsuit was not "objectively meritless," the district court
noted that it had to view the lawsuit from the perspective of an
objective litigant when it was filed. The court also emphasized
that the federal court action did not seek an injunction, but rather
damages under the Fair Housing Act.
The "objectively meritless" standard in the context of a suit
for damages... makes perfect sense. Allowing a court to grant
damages because of a person's purpose to interfere with fair housing rights is too broad to properly protect First Amendment
rights. The action must also have been without merit.2 30 Threat-

227. Id. at 15,979.4.
228. Id. at 15,979.9. The Court rejected the defendants' suggestion that it apply
the Noerr-Pennington"mere sham" standard applicable under the anti-trust laws.
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern Rail Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). Noerr-Pennington
shields those who petition the government from anti-trust liability unless their
activities are a mere sham. In Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures, 113 S. Ct. 1920, 1927-28 (1993), the United States Supreme Court emphasized that neither the Noerr-Pennington immunity nor its sham exception turned
on subjective intent alone. The Court outlined a two part definition of sham litigation:
First, the lawsuit must be objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits. If an objective
litigant could conclude that the suit is reasonably calculated to elicit a favorable outcome, the suit is immunized under Noerr, and an antitrust claim
premised on the sham exception must fail. Only if challenged litigation is
objectively meritless may a court examine the litigant's subjective motivation. Under this second part of our definition of sham, the court should focus
on whether the baseless lawsuit conceals "an attempt to interfere directly
with the business relationships of a competitor. . . ." through the "use [of]
the governmental process - as opposed to the outcome of that process - as
an anticompetitive weapon."
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
229. A suit for an injunction against filing a lawsuit in state court will have to
meet the Anti-Injunction Act and Younger abstention problems raised by the Court
of Appeals in Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico, 988 F.2d 252 (1st
Cir. 1993). The First Amendment concerns are not as apparent in a suit requesting an injunction as in a suit for damages. In a damage suit in federal court to
enjoin a state court action, the plaintiff is simply asking the federal court to decide
the issue whether the action can be properly maintained in the state forum.
230. In Tizes v. Curcio, P.H. Fair Housing - Fair Lending 9 16,021 (N.D. Ill.
1995), the district court in ruling on a motion to dismiss a complaint took a somewhat broader view then that urged above when the filing of a lawsuit was combined with other acts of harassment. Id. at 16,021.2. The Tizes filed suit for equitable and monetary relief against neighbors who engaged in an ethnically-motivated
campaign to harass the Tizes and delay the family's plans to renovate their properties. Id. The neighbors filed objection to the renovation before the Chicago Land-
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ening tenants with evictions because they entertain black
232
guests23 1 or filing a lawsuit for damages to harass testers
are good examples of fair housing cases that do not implicate the
First Amendment because they lack objective merit. Cases like
United States v. Scott,233 where the state trial court found that
the action to enforce a neutral restrictive covenant was not clearly
frivolous, would probably not meet this standard.
CONCLUSION

Housing discrimination is at the heart of many societal problems in the United States. Consequently, congress has mandated
its elimination. People feel strongly about their homes and their
neighborhoods and are apt to express themselves vigorously when
they perceive a threat. The First Amendment guarantees everyone
the right to speak out on issues concerning them. However, the
First Amendment is not absolute. Vigorous enforcement of the
Fair Housing Act does not inevitably conflict with the First
Amendment. Fair housing can be achieved without encroaching on
First Amendment freedoms. The right to be free from discrimination and the right to speak freely go hand-in-hand in a
just society. Controlling anti-social conduct is required; policing
thought is not required. Some cases will require careful line-drawing, but in most cases the line is fairly self-evident.

mark Commission, the Department of Zoning and the Department of Buildings. Id.
They also filed a lawsuit in state court seeking review of the zoning decision. Id.
The federal court denied a motion to dismiss the complaint. Id. The court held that
.so long as the Tizes' Complaint alleges that the Defendants used the petitioning
process primarily, if not exclusively, to harass or to discriminate against the Tizes,
the Complaint states a potentially valid claim for relief, the First Amendment
right to petition and the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine notwithstanding." Id. 16,021.4.
The court noted that the complaint alleged that the petitioning activity was part of
a broader scheme to harass and intimidate the Tizes, which included the use of
ethnic and religious slurs, the leveling of physical threats, attempted extortion and
destruction and interference with the Tizes' property rights. Id. The court also
rejected the defendant's abstention arguments. Id.
231. Woods-Drake v. Lundy, 667 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1982).
232. Northside Realty Assoc. v. Chapman, 422 F. Supp. 1195, 1200 (N.D. Ga.
1976).
233. 788 F. Supp. 1555 (D. Kan. 1992).

